The Cupboard is Bare

During the ISG deliberations:

Robb was especially interested in sending more U.S. forces, according to one participant, and the panel considered proposals to deploy 100,000 to 200,000 additional troops. Ultimately, though, the panel discovered that there might be only 20,000 available, prompting vigorous discussion that led members to conclude that a substantial surge was unworkable.

Remember when BushCheney complained of the "hollow Army" under Clinton? It was a distortion, just like so much he says. That "hollow Army" performed very well after September 11, 2001 and most likely would have continued to effectively fight terrorists had it not been siphoned into Iraq.

Six years later, Bill Clinton's Army looks good and he does not have 21,500 casualties and a wrecked country on his Permanent Record. These days the Army struggles to keep itself operating. Maybe not broken but badly bent, to be sure.

A Message to the Decider

Okay, Mr. BushCheney. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group has reported. You are about to receive reviews from the Defense and State Departments. A lot of expertise and information are cascading into your office. You are the Decider (remember?) so it's decision time on Iraq. But there's more to a decision than simply announcing it. You need to provide compelling reasons and support for your decision. Here's what I would consider compelling.

A clear, realistic statement of the national security issues facing this nation in Iraq and the broader region of which it is a part. I don't want some hyperbole about how they're coming to kill us all or they hate us for our freedoms. I want to know what the analysts tell you about Iraq and the Middle East. I want to know where analysts and experts agree, where they disagree and how you frame America's national security interests in that context.

Now tell me what you will do to address those security interests and how your strategy will change the situation in our favor. Exactly what will it accomplish and how will you know that it's working? There's been much talk of benchmarks in Iraq but these are usually six months to a year in scope. You need feedback much, much sooner so I want to know what changes and indicators you expect in the first few weeks. Think of it like a battle, where the results are real time and the need to react instantaneous.

Finally, what will you do if the strategy does not meet America's national security goals? Will you honestly re-think the strategy?

Now is the time for honest answers and realistic policies, not something that I associate with your administration, Mr. BushCheney. You have gone through the motions in Iraq: assessing threats, developing strategy and taking action but it's all been false, premised on lies, distortions and rampant fearmongering. All too predictably, you have created a major clusterfuck, destablizing one of the few secular Arab countries, unleashing sectarian violence and creating a destination for jihadis. So this time, I want more than words. I want to see the details. I sure as hell have no reason to trust you.

And you need to act quickly. Every day at least two Americans and scores of Iraqis die.

Human Being Joins BushCheney Administration

Secretary Defense designate Robert Gates at his confirmation hearing:

Gates, unlike some predecessors at the Pentagon, knew the war's total tally: 2,889 dead as of Monday morning. "Twelve graduates of Texas A&M have been killed in Iraq," said the nominee, who is A&M's president. "I would run in the morning with some of those kids. . . . I'd hand them their degrees, I'd attend their commissioning, and then I would get word of their death. So this all comes down to being very personal for all of us."

Ahead of the Curve?

Military commanders in Iraq are planning to re-assign American combat troops to serve as advisors and trainers to the Iraqi Army. It's a step toward what many see as the "kinder, gentler" Iraq policy: train them to restrain the forces of civil war so we can get the hell out. The plans aren't a new administration policy; commanders on the ground are trying to come up with something that works. That's what commanders are supposed to do.

The new policy takeks US troops out of direct combat but leaves them in that same environment. Only now they must depend on the skill and fortitude of Iraqi soldiers. Most GI's would be reluctant, I think, to put their lives at risk with the Iraqi sArmy. I would not wanted to have served with the South Vietnamese Army which a) actually existed and b) could fight creditably at times. The Iraqi Army seems only minimally capable at this point.

But GI's, being GI's, will take those risks. Time will tell if it works.

Which brings me to THE big question about America in Iraq: Time. Every scenario I hear about Iraq involves more time, at least 18 months and up to a decade. The only short time period I've heard lately is the six months General Abizaid says is the critical window for stabilzing Iraq.
Time and effort is the conversation America needs to have. How much are we going to put into Iraq and, most important, why. BushCheney denied us that opportunity before launching this war--his pro-war propaganda and fearmongering shut that door before we had a chance to look through it. Once the troops were in the field, most Americans just kept quiet.

But now after more than 23,000 American casualties, Americans are finallyasking "Why?" In response they get ever changing rationales and never attained promises. If BushCheney had come to America and promised a $500 billion war with tens of thousands of American and hundreds of thousand Iraqi casualties, he would never have convince Congress to abdicate its war making authority to him.

Now that America seems to be awake and asking questions, it is time to ask: How long? At what cost? To what end? And this time, America, don't just accept sound bites and nice platitudes. Make him explain.

In the meantime, American GI's will be out with the Iraqi Army trying to build a national institution where nationhood is still optional.

Theft and Betrayal

Dahr Jamail reports on Iraqi business under the Occupation. American companies profit while Iraqi businesses struggle and owners flee.

"I used to employ more than 30 workers in my plastic products factory, and business was good before the occupation," Abbas Ali told IPS in Baghdad. "It is impossible to work now, and I had to go back to my old job as school teacher. I was offered 200,000 dollars for the business, but now it is not worth anything. I blame myself for not selling it to flee, like some of my colleagues who live safely in Syria now." [...]

"There is no Iraqi brand any more," plastic products distributor Johar Aziz told IPS. "Iraqi products flourished during the quarter century before occupation, but now we only sell imported products of the lowest quality, and people have to buy them because there is no alternative." [...]

"We used to open our shops for at least 16 hours a day, but now we only open for a few hours because of the security threats," Duraid Abdullah, an electrical appliances shop owner in Karrada told IPS. "We are facing all kinds of threats starting from being abducted for money or sectarian reasons, as well as being evicted from our shops by gangs supported by government forces." [...]

"The picture of Japan after World War II dominated the minds of businessmen in Iraq after occupation," he said. "Most of us thought the American invasion of Iraq was bad for many things, but it must be good for business in general and industry in particular. We were terribly wrong. The Iraqi economy was meant to be destroyed for political reasons."

American Gulag

Todays's Washington Post:

A record 7 million people -- one in every 32 U.S. adults -- were behind bars, on probation or on parole by the end of last year, a Justice Department report released yesterday shows.

Of those, 2.2 million were in prison or jail, an increase of 2.7 percent over the previous year, according to the report.

[...]

From 1995 to 2003, inmates incarcerated in federal prisons for drug offenses have accounted for 49 percent of total prison population growth.

The domestic version of the military-industrail complex.