Learning Curves

About a year ago I spent an evening drinking beer with an Iraq war veteran who was among the first American troops to enter Baghdad in 2003. He said that American forces displayed amazing prowess in the invasion but noted that they lost that edge once the occupation began. At the same time, he saw Iraqis becoming more organized and sophisticated in their resistance to the occupation.

That discussion comes back to me as I read several recent articles. An article about improvised explosive devices in Asia Times notes:

“[The IED]...is being described as the defining weapon of the war in Iraq, lethal though low in technological sophistication. The IED is a simple weapon, easy and cheap to build, and easier to hide. This makes it an attractive weapon for insurgents....[snip]

The battle of the roadside bombs in Iraq is not just about detonating or defusing IEDs. It is about innovation and counter-innovation, ingenuity and guile. And the insurgents seem always a step ahead....”

Asia Times also reports on the findings of the International Crisis Group analysis of the Iraqi insurgency:

“...The 30-page report, based primarily on an analysis of the public communications of insurgent groups, as well as interviews and past studies about the insurgency, also concludes that rebel groups have adapted quickly and effectively to changing US tactics - in both the military and political spheres.

‘Over time, the insurgency appears to have become more coordinated, confident, sensitive to its constituents' demands and adept at learning from the enemy's successes and its own failures,’ said the report...."

The full report is here.

What we here, then, is a classic insurgency, taking advantage of whatever tactics work against a better armed, far more powerful foe. My drinking companion saw this beginning as early as 2003. Three years on, the insurgents’ adaptability and creativity have certainly limited the effectiveness of American forces in Iraq.

Americans, too, have adapted to changing conditions. The Washington Post reports on new tactics that show success in fighting the insurgency in Tal Afar, an insurgent stronghold. But even as one unit shows creativity and initiative, the long-term prospects
remain limited.

“...[It is not] clear that [this] example can be followed elsewhere by American commanders in the country. The biggest problem U.S. troops in Iraq face is Baghdad, a city about 30 times the size of Tall Afar. With the current number of American troops in Iraq, it would be impossible to copy the approach used here, with outposts every few blocks.

‘Baghdad is a much tougher nut to crack than this...It's a matter of scale -- you'd need a huge number of troops to replicate what we've done here.’ "

A “huge number of troops”. America heard this before.

Who is learning faster than whom?